Press Release available at AG’sWebsite
Attorney General’s Comment Letter available at AG’sWebsite(pdf)
On March 17, 2011, Attorney General Kamala Harris issued comments that climate action plans could be appropriate mitigation for a project’s greenhouse gas emission impacts under CEQA -- provided that sufficient details and measures are included. The comments were provided in a letter from the AG’s office regarding Los Angeles County’s Santa Clarita Valley Area Plan’s EIR, which also interestingly shows that Harris’s office is likely to continue its predecessor’s practice of commenting on climate change impacts during the CEQA process.
The letter noted that to be adequate under CEQA, the mitigation must contain binding emission reduction targets and other performance criteria. These comments follow on the heels of last year’s CEQA Guideline greenhouse gas amendments -- which provide criteria and encouragement for developing climate action plans -- and the recent development of GHG thresholds by regional air quality management districts. As future climate action plans are developed, courts will likely additionally refine the requirements of such plans.
Tuesday, March 29, 2011
Complete and Adequate EIR Needed for Certification
Landvalue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of the California State University (filed Feb. 23, 2011; cert. for publ. Mar. 16, 2011) No. F058451, available at CourtWebsite
A recent Court of Appeals decision highlights the potentially harsh consequences of producing an incomplete EIR. In the case, an EIR for a mixed-use development project had not adequately analyzed potential impacts related to air quality, traffic and parking, and water supply. To remedy this error, the court required the approving agency to decertify the entire EIR and withdraw its approval of the project.
The court held that CEQA provides for EIR certification when the EIR is complete, and that partial certification is not compatible with this concept because an EIR is either complete or it is not. Thus, even though an EIR may only be inadequate in some areas of its analysis, courts must set aside the entirety of the EIR certification and project approval. Although some prior court decisions have not required entire decertification of partially inadequate EIRs, this decision highlights the possibility that agency review of the full EIR and approval may be required by a court – even where only portions of the EIR are found inadequate.
A recent Court of Appeals decision highlights the potentially harsh consequences of producing an incomplete EIR. In the case, an EIR for a mixed-use development project had not adequately analyzed potential impacts related to air quality, traffic and parking, and water supply. To remedy this error, the court required the approving agency to decertify the entire EIR and withdraw its approval of the project.
The court held that CEQA provides for EIR certification when the EIR is complete, and that partial certification is not compatible with this concept because an EIR is either complete or it is not. Thus, even though an EIR may only be inadequate in some areas of its analysis, courts must set aside the entirety of the EIR certification and project approval. Although some prior court decisions have not required entire decertification of partially inadequate EIRs, this decision highlights the possibility that agency review of the full EIR and approval may be required by a court – even where only portions of the EIR are found inadequate.
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
City's Approval of Demolition Permit Ruled "Ministerial" Act Not Subject to CEQA
Friends of the Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto (Oct. 27, 2010) No. H033275, available at CourtWebsite
In a decision that will impact agencies’ distinction between ministerial and discretionary actions, a court recently held that a demolition permit approval under the City of Palo Alto’s municipal code was a “ministerial” act. Importantly, CEQA does not apply to ministerial actions. Thus, the City was not required to comply with CEQA review prior to approving the demolition permit.
The case concerned the Juana Briones House -- a designated historic landmark that became subject to a Mills Act historic preservation contract in 1988. In 1989, however, the Loma Prieta earthquake struck, causing substantial damage to the property, which ultimately led the latest owners to apply for a demolition permit in 1998 –- after the 10-year preservation contract had expired.
The City initially denied the demolition permit. But, the owners sued, and won a requirement from the court that the City must hold a hearing on their permit application. At the hearing, the City determined the action was “ministerial” and not subject to CEQA. The City then issued the demolition permit.
This time, a group named the Friends of Juana Briones House sued, alleging that the action was "discretionary" -- and thus the City had violated CEQA by failing to perform CEQA review.
In ruling that the City was correct in its ministerial determination, the court made the following holdings:
1) the Palo Alto municipal code only imposed a temporary moratorium on demolition -- not directives to the City to make discretionary considerations like prior cases had involved;
2) the City could not impose conditions on the permit for alleviating environmental conditions, but it could only impose voluntary conditions for preserving certain antiques and native plants, and those conditions did not re-characterize the action as discretionary;
3) the need for a future building permit did not require CEQA review under the “whole of the action” theory, because future action on a building permit might not be “significant in that it will change the scope and nature of the initial project or its environmental consequences”;
4) the possibility that the City could take the property through eminent domain did not make the action discretionary; and
5) there were no procedural violations that justified further proceedings. Thus, the court concluded the decision on the demolition permit was ministerial, and CEQA review was not required.
In a decision that will impact agencies’ distinction between ministerial and discretionary actions, a court recently held that a demolition permit approval under the City of Palo Alto’s municipal code was a “ministerial” act. Importantly, CEQA does not apply to ministerial actions. Thus, the City was not required to comply with CEQA review prior to approving the demolition permit.
The case concerned the Juana Briones House -- a designated historic landmark that became subject to a Mills Act historic preservation contract in 1988. In 1989, however, the Loma Prieta earthquake struck, causing substantial damage to the property, which ultimately led the latest owners to apply for a demolition permit in 1998 –- after the 10-year preservation contract had expired.
The City initially denied the demolition permit. But, the owners sued, and won a requirement from the court that the City must hold a hearing on their permit application. At the hearing, the City determined the action was “ministerial” and not subject to CEQA. The City then issued the demolition permit.
This time, a group named the Friends of Juana Briones House sued, alleging that the action was "discretionary" -- and thus the City had violated CEQA by failing to perform CEQA review.
In ruling that the City was correct in its ministerial determination, the court made the following holdings:
2) the City could not impose conditions on the permit for alleviating environmental conditions, but it could only impose voluntary conditions for preserving certain antiques and native plants, and those conditions did not re-characterize the action as discretionary;
3) the need for a future building permit did not require CEQA review under the “whole of the action” theory, because future action on a building permit might not be “significant in that it will change the scope and nature of the initial project or its environmental consequences”;
4) the possibility that the City could take the property through eminent domain did not make the action discretionary; and
5) there were no procedural violations that justified further proceedings.
Monday, November 29, 2010
Court Upholds City’s Discretion to Determine Baseline for Environmental Review and Provides Guidance on Infeasible Agricultural Resources Mitigation
Cherry Valley Pass Acres and Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (Cherry Valley) (Nov 22, 2010) No. E049651, available at CourtWebsite
In a decision affirming the discretion of local agencies to determine the proper “baseline” when conducting environmental review, the Court of Appeal sided with Best Best & Krieger LLP attorneys Michelle Ouellette and Fernando Avila, and upheld the groundwater analysis in an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared for a 560-unit housing development. The decision in Cherry Valley Pass Acres and Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (Cherry Valley) also provided important guidance as to what types of circumstances support a finding that agricultural resources mitigation is infeasible, an issue that many agencies face while complying with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
In Cherry Valley, a local opposition group challenged the recirculated EIR prepared for a 560-unit housing development, which was itself a scaled-down version of an earlier proposal. Project opponents argued that the City of Beaumont’s (City’s) baseline for water usage on the site was improper because it reflected the amount of water being pumped at the time the Notice of Preparation was released (when the site was an operating egg ranch), and not the minimal amount of water usage occurring at the time the recirculated EIR was released. The court disagreed, holding that the egg ranch’s vested, adjudicated groundwater rights and its history of water usage on the site supported the City’s use of that as a baseline.
The court also noted that the record contained ample evidence supporting a finding that on- and off-site mitigation for agricultural resources impacts, as well as project alternatives that lessened those impacts, would all be infeasible. Key to this determination were the facts that the City’s General Plan explicitly did not anticipate that agriculture could continue long-term and foresaw the eventual conversion of farmland and that the City’s financial analysis determined that various project alternatives that would preserve agricultural uses on-site were not viable.
The Cherry Valley decision represents an important reaffirmation of public agencies’ discretion to conduct environmental analysis and make determinations provided only that they are supported by substantial evidence, even in hotly-debated fields such as water supply and agricultural resources.
Source: www.bbklaw.com
In a decision affirming the discretion of local agencies to determine the proper “baseline” when conducting environmental review, the Court of Appeal sided with Best Best & Krieger LLP attorneys Michelle Ouellette and Fernando Avila, and upheld the groundwater analysis in an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared for a 560-unit housing development. The decision in Cherry Valley Pass Acres and Neighbors v. City of Beaumont (Cherry Valley) also provided important guidance as to what types of circumstances support a finding that agricultural resources mitigation is infeasible, an issue that many agencies face while complying with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
In Cherry Valley, a local opposition group challenged the recirculated EIR prepared for a 560-unit housing development, which was itself a scaled-down version of an earlier proposal. Project opponents argued that the City of Beaumont’s (City’s) baseline for water usage on the site was improper because it reflected the amount of water being pumped at the time the Notice of Preparation was released (when the site was an operating egg ranch), and not the minimal amount of water usage occurring at the time the recirculated EIR was released. The court disagreed, holding that the egg ranch’s vested, adjudicated groundwater rights and its history of water usage on the site supported the City’s use of that as a baseline.
The court also noted that the record contained ample evidence supporting a finding that on- and off-site mitigation for agricultural resources impacts, as well as project alternatives that lessened those impacts, would all be infeasible. Key to this determination were the facts that the City’s General Plan explicitly did not anticipate that agriculture could continue long-term and foresaw the eventual conversion of farmland and that the City’s financial analysis determined that various project alternatives that would preserve agricultural uses on-site were not viable.
The Cherry Valley decision represents an important reaffirmation of public agencies’ discretion to conduct environmental analysis and make determinations provided only that they are supported by substantial evidence, even in hotly-debated fields such as water supply and agricultural resources.
Source: www.bbklaw.com
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
California Voters Reject Effort to Suspend Global Warming Law (AB 32)
California voters yesterday rejected Proposition 23, a measure that supporters argued would save jobs and prevent increased energy costs. Had it passed, Prop 23 would have suspended California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, widely known as AB 32, until unemployment in the state lowered to specified levels.
The results of the gubernatorial election also indicate that implementation of AB 32 will not be delayed. During the campaign, though she did not back Prop 23, gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman had pledged to suspend implementation of AB 32 for at least a year. Jerry Brown, the winner in yesterday’s gubernatorial race, opposed efforts to suspend AB 32, though during the campaign he stated that he would be open to adjustments to the law.
In the short term, these election results mean that AB 32's implementation will continue. In fact, the public comment period on the Air Resources Board’s proposed Cap and Trade regulations opened on Monday. Entities that will be directly affected by AB 32 include industries, such as petroleum refineries and manufacturers, that produce large amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Municipalities and public utilities may also be directly affected through regulations on energy production, solid waste disposal and wastewater treatment.
Tuesday’s election did not remove all uncertainty regarding implementation of AB 32, however, as the electorate did enact Proposition 26. That measure amended the California Constitution to treat regulatory fees more like taxes. Opponents and proponents of the measure produced conflicting predictions of exactly how Prop 26 would affect the funding source for AB 32 and other environmental laws. Future argument over the precise effect of the change is likely.
Source: www.BBKLaw.com
The results of the gubernatorial election also indicate that implementation of AB 32 will not be delayed. During the campaign, though she did not back Prop 23, gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman had pledged to suspend implementation of AB 32 for at least a year. Jerry Brown, the winner in yesterday’s gubernatorial race, opposed efforts to suspend AB 32, though during the campaign he stated that he would be open to adjustments to the law.
In the short term, these election results mean that AB 32's implementation will continue. In fact, the public comment period on the Air Resources Board’s proposed Cap and Trade regulations opened on Monday. Entities that will be directly affected by AB 32 include industries, such as petroleum refineries and manufacturers, that produce large amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Municipalities and public utilities may also be directly affected through regulations on energy production, solid waste disposal and wastewater treatment.
Tuesday’s election did not remove all uncertainty regarding implementation of AB 32, however, as the electorate did enact Proposition 26. That measure amended the California Constitution to treat regulatory fees more like taxes. Opponents and proponents of the measure produced conflicting predictions of exactly how Prop 26 would affect the funding source for AB 32 and other environmental laws. Future argument over the precise effect of the change is likely.
Source: www.BBKLaw.com
Monday, October 11, 2010
Requirements for Exhausting Administrative Remedies Before Challenging CEQA Exemptions May or May Not Apply
Tomlinson v. County of Alameda (Oct. 6, 2010) No. A125471, available at CourtWebsite [discussing Hines v. California Coastal Commission (June 17, 2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, available at CourtWebsite.]
This case was initially decided by the court on June 18, 2010 [CEQA Blog Summary]. However, at almost the same time, another court issued its decision in Hines v. California Coastal Commission (June 17, 2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, which dealt with similar requirements for “exhausting” administrative remedies under CEQA. Under the “exhaustion” doctrine, project challengers generally must raise their arguments to the lead agency before they can petition the court to review the agency’s decision. Due to the closeness of these cases, the court decided to rehear this portion of its decision, and – in the end – highlighted the extreme legal complexities involved with “exhausting” administrative remedies. Importantly, this revised decision does not change the court’s holding regarding what constitutes “within city limits” for purposes of exempting infill projects under CEQA Guidelines, section 15332, as was previously reported.
As the new decision notes, the Hines court held that parties challenging a project have failed to “exhaust” under Public Resources Code, section 21177, subdivision (e), if there are “public hearings that include environmental review, ample notice of such hearings is given notifying the public of the agency’s reliance on the exemption, and the public does not raise an objection to the exemption despite such an opportunity to do so.” Throughout the planning process, the Hines challengers did not raise any issue regarding purported CEQA violations at any stage, despite ample notice that staff considered the project exempt, and there was ample opportunity to raise an objection. As a result, the Hines court would have had to decide factual questions about whether wildlife would be impacted and whether the project would open the door to successive projects. This would have entailed much more than merely reviewing the agency's decision. Thus, the court indicated it was appropriate for the Hines court to hold that the challengers could not petition for review of the agency action, because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not raising such CEQA challenges to the agency.
The court distinguished the Tomlinsons' argument, because the question at issue - whether the project occurred “within city limits” for applying the "infill" exemption - did not require particular agency expertise or an evidentiary determination. Thus, the court stood by its original application of Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, that “exhaustion” under section 21177, subdivision (a), would only apply if CEQA provides a public comment period or there is a public hearing before a notice of determination is issued. Finding that exemption determinations do not have these requirements, the court held that the Tomlinsons were not required to "exhaust" by raising specific objections that the project was not “within city limits” in order to seek judicial review of the applied "infill" exemption.
The court’s rehearing of this matter, and its discussion and application of Hines and Azusa, importantly highlights the complexity of "exhaustion" arguments that can be raised related to challenges against a CEQA exemption. Through these decisions, courts have required exhaustion in situations where a lack of comments rendered the court unable to discern the agencies’ factual bases for the exemption; however, courts have not required exhaustion when the exemptions' factual bases were clearly discernable for judicial review. Therefore, the ability of a challenger to seek judicial review without having raised specific arguments to the agency is likely to be impacted by the availability of evidence for the court to adequately perform a review of the exemption.
This case was initially decided by the court on June 18, 2010 [CEQA Blog Summary]. However, at almost the same time, another court issued its decision in Hines v. California Coastal Commission (June 17, 2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, which dealt with similar requirements for “exhausting” administrative remedies under CEQA. Under the “exhaustion” doctrine, project challengers generally must raise their arguments to the lead agency before they can petition the court to review the agency’s decision. Due to the closeness of these cases, the court decided to rehear this portion of its decision, and – in the end – highlighted the extreme legal complexities involved with “exhausting” administrative remedies. Importantly, this revised decision does not change the court’s holding regarding what constitutes “within city limits” for purposes of exempting infill projects under CEQA Guidelines, section 15332, as was previously reported.
As the new decision notes, the Hines court held that parties challenging a project have failed to “exhaust” under Public Resources Code, section 21177, subdivision (e), if there are “public hearings that include environmental review, ample notice of such hearings is given notifying the public of the agency’s reliance on the exemption, and the public does not raise an objection to the exemption despite such an opportunity to do so.” Throughout the planning process, the Hines challengers did not raise any issue regarding purported CEQA violations at any stage, despite ample notice that staff considered the project exempt, and there was ample opportunity to raise an objection. As a result, the Hines court would have had to decide factual questions about whether wildlife would be impacted and whether the project would open the door to successive projects. This would have entailed much more than merely reviewing the agency's decision. Thus, the court indicated it was appropriate for the Hines court to hold that the challengers could not petition for review of the agency action, because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not raising such CEQA challenges to the agency.
The court distinguished the Tomlinsons' argument, because the question at issue - whether the project occurred “within city limits” for applying the "infill" exemption - did not require particular agency expertise or an evidentiary determination. Thus, the court stood by its original application of Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, that “exhaustion” under section 21177, subdivision (a), would only apply if CEQA provides a public comment period or there is a public hearing before a notice of determination is issued. Finding that exemption determinations do not have these requirements, the court held that the Tomlinsons were not required to "exhaust" by raising specific objections that the project was not “within city limits” in order to seek judicial review of the applied "infill" exemption.
The court’s rehearing of this matter, and its discussion and application of Hines and Azusa, importantly highlights the complexity of "exhaustion" arguments that can be raised related to challenges against a CEQA exemption. Through these decisions, courts have required exhaustion in situations where a lack of comments rendered the court unable to discern the agencies’ factual bases for the exemption; however, courts have not required exhaustion when the exemptions' factual bases were clearly discernable for judicial review. Therefore, the ability of a challenger to seek judicial review without having raised specific arguments to the agency is likely to be impacted by the availability of evidence for the court to adequately perform a review of the exemption.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
UC Regents' EIR and Approval Upheld Despite Numerous Alleged Deficiencies
California Oak Foundation v. Regents of the University of California (Sept. 3, 2010) No. A122511, available at CourtWebsite.
The California Oak Foundation and others filed petitions challenging the Regents of the University of California’s certification of an EIR and approval of a project for building athletic facilities at the Berkeley campus. The Oak Foundation alleged that the EIR was inadequate under CEQA in its (1) description of baseline conditions; (2) project description; (3) statement of objectives; (4) discussion of alternatives; and (5) discussion of biological and archaeological impacts. It also alleged improper (1) delegating of authority to certify the EIR to the Regents’ Committee on Grounds and Buildings; (2) giving approval to the project before certifying the EIR; (3) failing to recirculate the Draft EIR; and (4) making findings and a statement of overriding considerations without evidentiary support. The court rejected all of these arguments.
First, the court found that the EIR accurately described the existing baseline conditions, and the geotechnical study made available after DEIR circulation adequately matched up with that baseline. Release of the study after circulation also did not require recirculation because it did not constitute significant new information and merely confirmed information already stated. The court held that omitting discussion of the California Geological Survey and United States Geological Survey comment letters was of no consequence because they did not show that the conclusions in the geology report were erroneous.
The court found the project’s description complied with CEQA Guidelines, section 15124. Evidence supported the degree of specificity used. The methodology for presenting and analyzing project alternatives in matrix and narrative format was appropriate despite some broad wording. The significant environmental impacts and corresponding components of each of the alternatives were evaluated against the corresponding component of the project, thus demonstrating a good faith effort to provide a meaningful discussion of a range of reasonable project alternatives, which according to the court was all that CEQA requires. Finally, substantial evidence supported the Regents’ conclusions on archeological and biological resources, their findings, and the statement of overriding considerations.
The court held that the Committee on Grounds and Buildings appropriately certified the EIR based on its approval authority over the project. Further, the project was not approved before certifying the EIR because the Regents’ policy related to its earlier approval of funding did not constitute project approval until completion of the project’s design review.
Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of the California Oak Foundation’s petition for writ of mandate and upheld the EIR certification and project approval.
The California Oak Foundation and others filed petitions challenging the Regents of the University of California’s certification of an EIR and approval of a project for building athletic facilities at the Berkeley campus. The Oak Foundation alleged that the EIR was inadequate under CEQA in its (1) description of baseline conditions; (2) project description; (3) statement of objectives; (4) discussion of alternatives; and (5) discussion of biological and archaeological impacts. It also alleged improper (1) delegating of authority to certify the EIR to the Regents’ Committee on Grounds and Buildings; (2) giving approval to the project before certifying the EIR; (3) failing to recirculate the Draft EIR; and (4) making findings and a statement of overriding considerations without evidentiary support. The court rejected all of these arguments.
First, the court found that the EIR accurately described the existing baseline conditions, and the geotechnical study made available after DEIR circulation adequately matched up with that baseline. Release of the study after circulation also did not require recirculation because it did not constitute significant new information and merely confirmed information already stated. The court held that omitting discussion of the California Geological Survey and United States Geological Survey comment letters was of no consequence because they did not show that the conclusions in the geology report were erroneous.
The court found the project’s description complied with CEQA Guidelines, section 15124. Evidence supported the degree of specificity used. The methodology for presenting and analyzing project alternatives in matrix and narrative format was appropriate despite some broad wording. The significant environmental impacts and corresponding components of each of the alternatives were evaluated against the corresponding component of the project, thus demonstrating a good faith effort to provide a meaningful discussion of a range of reasonable project alternatives, which according to the court was all that CEQA requires. Finally, substantial evidence supported the Regents’ conclusions on archeological and biological resources, their findings, and the statement of overriding considerations.
The court held that the Committee on Grounds and Buildings appropriately certified the EIR based on its approval authority over the project. Further, the project was not approved before certifying the EIR because the Regents’ policy related to its earlier approval of funding did not constitute project approval until completion of the project’s design review.
Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of the California Oak Foundation’s petition for writ of mandate and upheld the EIR certification and project approval.
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